Introduction
Incidence Calculus 11,2,6) and Dempster-Shafer The ory of Evidence 13, 5, 8) are two alternative theories to represent uncertain knowledge in reasoning systems. They present a series of similarities:
1. Both of them have been proposed as extensions of the Bayesian approach.
2. Both of them have proposed interval-based probability extensions.
3. Both of them have considered a specific kind of uncertainty, the probability ass ignment on pos sible worlds 14].
The main difference between them is that Dempster In this paper we present some equivalence proofs be tween these theories, when applied over finite propo sitional languages. This is made possible due to the results presented by Fagin and Halpern in 13], and the proofs are achievable through the use of a refor mulated version of Fagin and Halpern's probability structures.
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Preliminary Definitions
Probability Space
Following 13], a probability space is a tuple (S,x,�-£), where S is a sample space, x is a u-algebra of 81, and 1-' is a probability measure of x:
1-' : x -10, 1] such that
(H x is finite, this last property turns to �o£(Xl u,X2) = �-£(XI) + �o£(X2), X1 n X2 = 0, X1,X2 ex and allows us to derive the following corollaries:
1that ia, x ia a aet of aubeeta of S auch that S E x and x ia cloaed under complementation and countable union {b) �{0) = o, where 0 stands for the empty set)
The probability measure is defined only on X, that is a subset of the power set 2 8 of S. It can be extended on 2 8 in a standard way, by defining the inner mea sure induced by � {�.):
that, due to the codomain of the measure func tion and property 2., can be rewritten, for finite u algebras, as:
Given a u-algebra x, the subset x' � x is called a basis of x iff all members of x' are disjoint and nonempty and x consists precisely of countable unions of members of x'· It is provable that if x is finite then it has a basis [3] .
Propositional Language
The language we are going to consider is a finite propositional language. in the propoeitional language generated by •. con sisted by the disjunction of the elements of 'P · 2 A t represents all the formulae generated by�.
Fagin and Halpern [3J assumed that all the formulae generated by • had an interpretation, ie., allowed a truth assignment. We will assume that a 0'-algebra 1/J of At has interpretations. Since 2 A t is a 0'-algebra of At, our ass umption includes Fagin and Halpern's one.
Since • is finite, a 0'-algebra 1/J � 2 A t of At will be a set such that:
Probability Structure
In [3J a probability structure is defined as a tuple (S, x, �. 1r) , associated with a finite propositional language At. (S,x.�) is a probability space and 1r
is a truth-assignment mapping, that associates with each s E S a mapping 1r(s) : • -{true,false}.
Intuitively, each s corresponds to a possible world.
Alternatively, we define an incidence mapping i as a specific formulation of the inverse mapping of 11", that is:
with the following properties:
Thus, we restate a probability 3tructure as a tu ple (S,x.�,At,,P,i), where (S,x,�) is a probability space, At defines a propositional language, 1/J is a u-algebra of At and i is an incidence mapping.
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Dempster-Shafer Structure
Given a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive atomic events, Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence provides a way to attach degrees of belief on these events by defining belief and plausibility functions. We can formalise these concepts aa tuples (9, bel), Observe that the right-hand side of property .3. cor responds to the inclusion-exclusion rule for probabil ities [3, 7] .
The associated plau8ibility junction over 9 derives from the definition of the belief function:
Thus, to each event A we can associate a subset of 9 and attach an interval [bel,(A),plb.(.A.)J to which the probability of A belongs, where belt is the inf of bel and plb. is the sup of plb.
In [3] , a specific interpretation for Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence is provided. The set 9 is in terpreted as a set of possible worlds, to which the truth-evaluation of a finite propositional language is associated. In that case, it is proved that to any tu ple (9, bel) there is another tuple (8', bel'), in which 9' is finite and the evaluations of bel' and bel are equal for any formula in the ass ociated propositional language. It is also proved that to any tuple (8, bel) in which 8 is finite there is a corresponding probr bility structure {S, x, �-'• At, 2Ai, i ) in which the eval uations of bel and �-'• are equal for any formula, pr0o
vided that the propositional language is the same.
It is worth observing that S is also finite, in that case.
Thus, if we restrict our attention to Fagin and Halpern's interpretation and finite propoeitional lan guages, we can take Demp6ter-Shafer structuru as probability structures ( S, x, �-'• At, 2At, i), in which bel is the inner measnre induced by 14 and S is fi nite.
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We define Total Dempder-Sh.afer structure$ as tu ples (S, x, JJ, At, 2At, i) in which the image of the in cidence mapping contains the u-algebra of the prob ability structure, that is, for all X E x there is a tp E z At such that i(rp) = X. In other words, Total
Dempster-Shafer structures guarantee that all the measurable sets of possible worlds refer to some for mula in the propositional language under consider ation.
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Incidence Calculus Struc ture Incidence Calculus [1, 2, 6] was proposed as an alter native way to attach and propagate degrees of belief on propositions. Here we have, as before, a set S of possible worlds, a probability measure associated with sets of possible worlds and an incidence map ping from propositions of a propositional language to possible worlds.
Differently from before, though, the probability measure is defined on the whole power set 28 of S -and the incidence mapping is defined only on a generic 0'-algebra of atomic propositions. These concepts are captured by the probability structure (S, 25, �-'• At, ,P, i), where the symbols are defined as before.
The inference rules in the Legal Assignment Finder procedure [1, 2] extend the incidence mapping on all formulae, by determining the sets of possible worlds that would contain and the ones that would be con tained by those in which the formulae are true. That is, the incidence mapping is extended to lower and There is a correspondence between Total Dempster Shafer structures and Incidence Calculus structures -that is, there is an association of an equivalent Total Dempster-Shafer structure to each Incidence Calculus structure, and vice-versa. Intuitively, it means that {Incidence Calculus ) probability bound aries over propositions can be "translated" into {Dempster-Shafer) proability boundaries over pos sible worlds and vice-versa. Formally, these state ments can be presented and proved as below:
For every Incidence Calculus Probabil ity Structure there iiJ an equivalent Total Dempater-Shafer Probability Structure. For every Total Dempater-Shafer Prob ability Structure there is an equivalent In cidence CGlculuiJ Probability Structure.
Proof: Given a Total Dempster-Shafer structure 381 (S, x, 1£1 At, 2At, i) we define an Incidence Calculus structure ( S ic • zs;., J.'i c , At, tPic, i ic) , where S;c = x', J.'ic = JJ, 1P: c = {{S,} : i(c,) E Sic1 Ci E At}, and iic(IO) = i( IO ) , 10 E tPic· Then we have that bel(e) = J.'(U X: X s; i(e ), X Ex)= J.'(U(i(cp)): i ( <p) � i (e) , i ( <p) E X) = = P(U(i(<p)): <p s; e , i(<p) ex) = JJ(U(i(<p) ) : <p � e, 'P E tPic) = = I"(U(i,c(IP)) : <p � e, <p E tPic) = J.'ic(U(i,c(cp)) : 10 s; e , <p E tP;c) = = Jlic(i;c(U <p: <p s; e. <p E tPic)) = J.'ic(i.(e))
QED 7 Example
As an example, one problem is solved by using equiv alent structures belonging to each theory. The prob lem is the one presented in [3] -example 2.2, and stated here as follows:
A person has four coats: two are blue and single-breasted, one is grey and double-breasted and one is grey and single breasted. To choose which color of coat this penon is going to wear, one tosses a (fair} coin. Once the colour is chosen, to choose which specific coat to wear the person uses a mysterious nondeterministic procedure which we don't know anything about . What is the probability of the per son wearing a single-breasted coat? Observe that this structure is total.
The desired answer, is undefined. The lower and upper bounds for this value are:
It means that, although we have no means to eval uate the probability of the person to wear a single breasted coat, we know that it is not smaller than 0.5.
'T .2 Incidence Calculus Solution
To solve the same problem using Incidence Calcu lus, instead of constructing a set of possible worlds -some of which being nonmeasurable -with each one corresponding to one possible situation, we con struct a. set of possible worlda with each one corre sponding to one me�Uurc&ble situation, that may be a set of subsets of the formerly considered situations.
For example, let's construct an Incidence Calculus structure by applying the procedure pointed out in Theorem 6.2 on the formulation of section 7.1:
Let Sie = { w11 w2 } , where W1 and w2 correspond to the possible worlds in which the blue and grey coats are worn, respectively. This is the basis of Xd• ( w1 = {s1 , -'2},W 2 = {ss, ""} ) .
Let 4l and At be a.s before. Now, 2S;c = {0, { w l}, { W2}1 S;c}, The desired answer, J. 
